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Introduction 
This paper describes the potential to enhance 
the performance and reliability of small satel-
lites by using increased levels of digital pro-
cessing on-board the spacecraft. It describes 
an architecture, developed by Control Data, 
that will satisfy its users' needs and provide 
mechanisms for high reliability. The term 
"SMARTSAT" means a small satellite that has 
significant "smarts" (processing capability) 
on-board. 
Increasing The Capabilities of Small 
Satellites 
Small satellites have two operationally driven 
requirements that differentiate their operation 
from large satellite systems: 
(1) A need for operational autonomy, and 
(2) A need to directly supply users with data. 
These requirements relate to the fact that the 
small satellite will probably be in Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO) and will therefore have short 
time windows over a ground station. This condi-
tion impacts the total architecture and design of 
the spacecraft and provides the opponunity 
for significant improvements in capability by 
sophisticated on-board processing. 
Need For Autonomy 
A small satellite must be capable of maintain-
ing its health and welfare for sustained peri-
ods of time without involvement of a ground 
support center. Depending on the orbit select-
ed, a small satellite in a low earth orbit may 
only pass over a ground support facility once 
or twice per day. As a result, regular and 
timely communications are difficult, if not 
impossible. While the placement of several 
mission support centers around the world 
could alleviate this problem, the expense of 
installing and maintaining hardware and 
trained support personnel is prohibitive. In 
addition, small satellite economics will proba-
bly preclude the cost associated with a tradi-
tional mission support center. 
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A second factor emphasizing the benefit of 
autonomy is the vulnerability of fixed ground 
stations. This is especially true of any satel-
lite that would be used during periods of 
intense conflict. At such times, the task of 
rendering specific ground stations inoperable 
is not difficult considering today's technology. 
In addition, experiences with natural events, 
such as seismic disturbances, impacting space 
operations serve to emphasize further the advan-
tages of highly autonomous space systems. 
A third factor related to autonomous operation 
is ground station workload. As small satellite 
constellations become more dense, the task of 
providing traditional levels of ground support 
will increase. Without enhanced levels of 
autonomy in the satellite, the complexity of 
managing these constellations will add cost 
and workload to a force structure that needs 
relief in both areas. New control and data 
processing centers would need to be con-
structed to support tactical satellites. 
In addition, for tactical applications, a launch-
on-demand capability requires very respon-
sive launches. Associated with this capability 
is the urgent need for the spacecraft to quickly 
stabilize and start its assigned mission. The 
launch-on-demand capability will need self-
aligning systems free of human dependence if 
timely response is to be realized. 
The net result of these considerations is that a 
high degree of operational autonomy is very 
desirable for the success of the small satellite 
concepts being advanced today. This is espe-
cially true for tactical applications where long 
term stability, quick response, and error-free 
operation are essential for mission success. 
Direct Downlinks to the User 
To take full advantage of the opponunities 
offered by small satellite systems. mission 
related data must be downlinked directly to 
users on the ground. This eliminates the 
need for, and the delay associated with, hav-
ing a large ground processing station in the 
distribution path. This is especially critical 
for applications that require timely data 
distribution in which critical decisions must 
be made in real-time. 
If small satellites are to be successful, the data 
distribution system must not be forced to trav-
el the traditional path from space to the ulti-
mate user. The existing system was not 
designed for rapid distribution of data to tacti-
cal users, although it is satisfactory for its 
intended use. The data distribution pipelines 
in place today are already stressed with data 
overload; it would be very expensive to 
expand to cope with increased data loads on a 
real-time basis. 
The above considerations require a direct 
downlink to the end users in a form that can 
be readily exploited on the ground. Because 
of the "time over station" associated with a 
LEO SMALLSAT, the direct downlink also 
implies a relatively narrow bandwidth to 
accommodate the use of unsophisticated 
ground receiving equipment. This translates 
to a need for higher levels of on-board pro-
cessing to deliver processed data over low 
bandwidth channels to users requiring fast, 
accurate, and relatively simple data capture. 
Enabling Capabilities 
During the past twenty five years there have 
been significant technology advances in digi-
tal electronics. While the processing power of 
computers has grown well beyond early plan-
ners' expectations, the space community has 
chosen to use a very conservative approach 
with minimal computing in space. The advent 
of Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl) forced 
the concept planners to break from this tradi-
tion. The primary cause is that the problem 
demands vast improvements in space comput-
ing for ballistic missile defense battle stations 
to be responsive. 
A compounding problem on the technology 
side is that as the geometry size of electronic 
devices was reduced, the circuits became 
more vulnerable to cosmic radiation. Also, as 
circuit speed increased, there was a correspond-
ing criticality introduced to the internal timing 
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sequences that were affected by radiation. 
SOl has funded research addressing these 
technology issues, and while there is much 
work yet to be done in this area, significant 
progress has been made. 
Space Computer Systems 
As a result of the SOl actions described 
above, and as a result of more than a decade 
of experience using increasingly sophisticated 
computing in spacecraft, industry now has key 
technology centers that are poised to construct 
space computer systems that are orders of 
magnitude more capable in terms of on-board 
processing power. These on-board systems 
focus on autonomy, fault tolerance, reliability, 
and modularization. They are designed to 
withstand the environmental stresses associat-
ed with the space environment, and to provide 
reliable, error-free operation. 
Tailorable Concept 
An important aspect of achieving the size, 
weight, and power envelope required for 
space operations is the tailoring of the space-
craft to a very specific suite of missions. A 
processing concept is required that can be eas-
ily and readily adapted to the range of require-
ments imposed by the various types of mis-
sions and sensors. This concept must allow 
for varying processor types and for degrada-
tion over the mission life. This approach pro-
vides the opportunity to maximize the synergy 
between the on-board processor and chip level 
processing capability that can be embedded 
into the sensor subsystems. This will provide 
levels of efficiency in data handling that are 
not feasible in today's environment. 
Small Satellite Suitability 
The advent of the small satellite is one of the 
developments that enables the advances in on-
board space processing power. This is the 
result of several factors: 
• Small satellites are mission specific. 
This provides the basis for advancing the 
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• 
integration of the processing and the sen-
sor system beyond traditional multi-mis-
sion space systems. 
The small satellite community is adopting 
a new philosophy for the design, assem-
bly, and operation of space systems. They 
are attempting to avoid many of the very 
rigid cultural issues associated with larger 
satellite programs that must, by definition, 
use very conservative technologies. 
• While the digital processing subsystem is 
an expensive component of present space 
systems, high levels of integration in the 
small satellite can result in processing that 
is more optimized as to function, and thus 
more system cost effective. By recogniz-
ing that the mission life will be of shorter 
duration, the digital processing suite on-
board can be designed to take advantage 
of relaxed failure rate allocations. This 
will bring the cost of the on-board pro-
cessing into line with small satellite 
expectations without compromising the 
probability of success of the mission. 
Downlink Considerations 
Simple Receivers 
Since it is possible to do data processing on-
board, downlinked data can be simple and 
comparatively low volume. Under these con-
ditions, a relatively small transceiver ade-
quately supports the user. 
Minimal Training Levels 
User-friendly on-board processing of data 
eliminates the need for data processing 
experts at the ground station. This allows a 
force commander to employ less specialized 
personnel in the receipt and display of petti-
nentdata. 
Portability 
The simplicity of the forward located ground 
station enables the direct field usage of the mis-
sion related data. A forward control facility 
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would have a workstation similar to today's 
commercial workstations, i.e., PC-based. The 
workstation would be used to receive format-
ted and image data from the SMARTSAT and 
to superimpose collateral locally stored 
imagery. This local imagery could include 
any (semi-)permanent data such as base maps, 
geological maps, or other icons representing 
"friendly" resources (or "hostiles" from other 
data sources). The required equipment could be 
transported by jeep for maximum portability. 
Possible Uplink for Tasking 
An uplink could be provided for the specific 
tasking of the SMARTSAT. Among other 
tasks, this might include moving the field of 
view to re-examine a target recently detected, 
performing an electronic zoom of a visible 
sensor to characterize a suspected target, con-
verting the visible sensor to a UV sensor to 
examine a suspected target in the UV spec-
trum, or directing the SMARTSAT to send 
surveillance infonnation via communication 
links to another commander. Redirection of 
the orbit would be beyond the permitted capa-
bility of the forward area located user, but 
would be accomplished by a CONUS ground 
station. 
Applications 
SMARTSATs have many military and com-
mercial applications. These applications, in 
general, require sensing of information from 
earth and retransmitting it in the same or 
altered form back to the earth. The sensors to 
be used are a function of the information 
required, and the retransmitted data needed is 
a function of the desires of the operator(s). 
These applications are divided into the follow-
ing four groups. 
Communications 
Voice and data communications between 
widely separate areas on the earth can be most 
easily accomplished by a "store and forward" 
system using relay stations that have "line of 
sight" access to the users. Geosynchronous 
satellites perfonn this function today. Under 
various conditions, however, these communi-
cation links could very easily be saturated 
with traffic. At such times, supplementary 
links could be established through SMART-
SATs. 
Weather Monitoring 
Existing weather observation systems often do 
not yield data with sufficient resolution for 
detailed (localized) planning and operations. 
A Low Earth Orbit (LEO) weather observa-
tion system could give a much more detailed 
picture of local conditions. 
Mapping 
Fine detail mapping of either geodetic features 
or resources could be accomplished by a LEO 
system. This mapping could provide detailed 
mapping of selected areas of the earth to pr0-
vide previously unavailable or rapidly chang-
ing data. 
Reconnaissance 
Fine detail reconnaissance of tactical situa-
tions could be readily available to a field com-
mander using small LEO SMARTSATs. 
Depending on the sensor suite on-board, 
threat warning and data could be available on 
a real-time basis. The concept of maintaining 
satellites on the ground so that they can be 
"launched-on-demand" in a very shott time 
period has become very attractive to the users. 
Currently, military reconnaissance is the driv-
ing requirement for small satellites. 
Processing Requirements 
Data processing requirements for the various 
applications will vary widely. These varia-
tions will be both in type of processing 
required and in quantity. 
Communications 
Communications satellites need processing for 
switching and routing of messages, both voice 
and data. Shott term storage will be required 
for messages for situations where simultaneous 
receipt and transmission is not practical, such as 
in the case where both stations are not "visible" 
and linking facilities are saturated. Estimates 
of the processing requirements for this type of 
• system are roughly 10 MIPS (Million Instruc-
tions Per Second) and 1 MBIT (MegaBm of 
RAM (Random Access Memory). 
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Weather Monitoring 
Weather monitoring is an image generation 
and storage problem, with processed images 
downlinked to the user. The processing 
requirements for this type of mission have been 
estimated at roughly 20 to 30 MIPS of pro-
cessing and roughly 10 to 40 MBIT of RAM. 
Mapping 
Mapping is another image generation and pro-
cessing problem. but is different in that the 
image data can be processed on-board and 
only data of interest is downlinked to the user. 
Data requirements for this type of system 
have been estimated at 20 to 40 MIPS and 20 
to 30 MBIT of RAM. 
Reconnaissance 
Multiple Sensor Suites 
Tactical reconnaissance is an area in which 
on-board processing can provide dramatic 
results. Today's technologies are producing 
sensor systems of such capability and com-
pactness that it is conceivable to place multi-
ple sensors on a given SMARTSAT to provide 
previously unavailable capabilities. This con-
cept enables multi-sensor coverage of target 
signatures, thus increasing threat detection 
confidence. For example, an IR. a visible, and 
an electronic intelligence sensor could be 
placed on the same SMARTSAT. This sensor 
suite would provide broad spectrum collateral 
coverage of suspect areas. The processing 
requirements for these sensors are estimated 
to be roughly 2 to 5 MIPS and 1 to 10 MBIT 
of RAM for each sensor. 
In the near future it will be possible to fly an 
adaptive Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) on a 
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SMARTSAT. This system could have the 
capability to both image ground areas and to 
detect and image moving targets. Moving tar-
get detection and imaging would be a great 
benefit to a force commander in the identifica-
tion of incoming threats. The radar subsystem 
would require considerably more on-board 
processing than the previously mentioned sen-
sors, Le., approximately 2700 MIPS of pro-
cessing and 1600 MBIT of RAM. Special 
purpose signal processors would perform the 
bulk of the processing load. In this applica-
tion, the downlink would consist of prepared 
images of either ground areas or moving tar-
gets, or locations of identified targets. 
A long standing goal of defense planners has 
been a "track from source" capability, Le., 
detecting threats immediately after departure 
from their bases, rather than electronic fences, 
i.e., detecting at a perimeter. By using a 
SMARTSAT constellation to draw a fence 
around known staging bases, coverage of the 
threat is provided every 50 to 60 minutes (for 
a constellation of six satellites). This capabili-
ty provides a very important aspect of early 
tactical warning and assessment. 
A secondary capability that greatly extends 
the track from source capability is the use of 
the SAR mode on a companion SMARTSAT 
to provide an air order of battle update of 
threat airfields. This periodic monitoring of 
the source bases would provide critical intelli-
gence of activities at the threat base. These 
capabilities have previously been infeasible 
because of the inability of present systems to 
see/track aircraft from geosynchronous alti-
tudes. 
A SMARTSAT constellation, launched-on-
demand during times of heightened tension, 
would offer·a show of deterrence before the 
onset of hostilities while providing the prima-
ry mission functions of warning and target 
detection. 
Downlink Simplicity 
With multi-sensor suite, it is possible to 
downlink only the earth coordinate location 
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and velocity vectors for individual threats. 
This would enable a force commander to 
counter such threats effectively with minimal 
wasted resources. Thus, the downlink 
required would be very small and the ground 
processing required would be only that needed 
to display the threats in whatever display 
mode would be most informative. 
Encryption Issues 
For a tactical SMARTSAT, communications 
security is a significant issue. Minimally, 
uplink security must be very tight. Downlink 
security may need to be tight or loose, 
depending on the sophistication of the on-
board processing and the operational concept. 
Encryption will double the telemetry process-
ing (up and down). 
Housekeeping 
Attitude control, orbital maintenance, and 
housekeeping functions would be required on 
all applications. This effort requires 1 to 2 
MIPS of processing and 2 to 3 MBIT of RAM. 
Processing System Concept 
Introduction 
SMARTSATs will require sufficient resources 
to perform basic payload control and house-
keeping functions in addition to mission func-
tions. Special telemetry related formatting not 
accomplished by the telemetry hardware can 
be included in the housekeeping function. 
Housekeeping includes statusing of satellite 
resources/subsystems and control of basic 
satellite functions that are prerequisites to per-
forming the mission, including: 
• Power Distribution and Control. This 
includes sensing of battery charge state, 
(dis)charging rate, voltage level, load 
shedding, solar array health status, and 
solar array pointing control. 
• Thermal Control. This includes monitor-
ing thermal sensors to detect hot (or cold) 
spots and to heat or cool subsystems or 
parts thereof when required. Some simple 
thermal management may be done by 
local resources such as thermostats. 
• Attitude Determination And Control 
(ADAC). This is a necessity for all satel-
lites, including SMARTSATs. In the past, 
ADAC has been effected through analog 
hardware. Recently, there has been impe-
tus to implement the control laws digitally. 
This provides more flexibility and poten-
tially more accuracy in that control law 
implementation (and sensor sampling rate 
control) may now be done via software. 
This standardization of hardware and spe-
cific mission tailoring by software elimi-
nates the need for different hardwired 
solutions to each application. This 
reduces the total cost of the SMARTSAT 
family amortized over a variety of mis-
sions and mission requirements. 
• Telemetry. This function includes format-
ting, time-tagging, and packetizing of data 
(mission or routine satellite health status), 
receipt and distribution of commands from 
the ground, encryption, and verification of 
command authenticity. 
Housekeeping and mission support functions, 
i.e., not part of the applications code, e.g., 
updating time tagged stored commands or 
shutdown of sensors or other resources in a 
battery/power crisis, are easily handled with 
today's spaceborne processors. However, the 
significantly laIger throughput and memory 
requirements associated with the missions 
described indicates that a single processor is 
inadequate, even state-of-the art flight com-
puters. This condition is further exacerbated 
by the previously mentioned desire to maxi-
mize satellite autonomy, which requires sig-
nificantly more on-board throughput, memory 
capacity, and possibly different processing 
element types. In response, Control Data has 
developed the Spaceborne Processing Array 
(SPA) concept. 
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Processing System Capabilities 
The Spaceborne Processing Array (SPA) con-
cept provides the following capabilities: 
• SPA supports a variety of missions. The 
system is modular, expandable, reconfig-· 
urable, and uses a family of processing 
modules that can be mixed and matched. 
• SPA, through its Module Interconnect 
Network (MIN), will allow data paths to 
be configured to match application data 
flow and a variety of data structures 
including rings, arrays, parallel or 
pipeline, and fanout. This provides maxi-
mal data path flexibility. 
• Data path reconfiguration isolates failed 
modules and incorporates functional mod-
ules from a group of similar spares. This 
achieves maximum reliability, especially 
for longer life missions. 
• SPA and MIN together provide support for 
a variety of strategies to effect fault detec-
tion, isolation, assessment, and recovery 
(FDIAR). This is true at the system, mod-
ule, and module element level. 
• MIN provides a high performance inter-
connect system to support signal and data 
processing at very high system throughput 
rates. 
• The multi-modular characteristics of SPA, 
along with the configurable features of 
MIN, allow for a system with distributed 
control. This greatly reduces the likeli-
hood of a system failure due to loss of a 
critical control function. Single point fail-
ure modes at the system level may be 
reduced or eliminated with this capability. 
Processing System Detailed Descrip-
tion 
The SPA concept is a system capable of pr0-
viding high performance, high reliability digi-
tal signal and data processing systems. An 
SPA is a modular collection of processing and 
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external input/output (I/O) resources. The 
modules are interconnected by the MIN. lbis 
network has a high bandwidth, low overhead, 
is reconfigurable, and is fault tolerant. The 
SPA concept allows a heterogeneous mix of 
modules, achieving greater optimization than 
could be achieved by universal modules. The 
following modules can be attached to the 
MIN: 
• General purpose computers - 16 and 32 bit 
• Fixed and floating point signal processors 
• Application specific I/O modules, i.e., 
high bandwidth sensor interfaces 
• Large volume, non-volatile memory units. 
Every module contains processing resources, 
instruction and data memory, and an interface 
to the MIN. Applications are generally, but 
not necessarily, data driven. 
The MIN is the heart of the SPA system; it 
distributes both power and data. Its bidirec-
tional, segmented ring approach eliminates 
fan-out problems while providing maximal 
path flexibility to support different missions. 
The MIN uses software configurable data 
paths to form logical data path structures on 
an interconnect that is a two dimensional 
physical mesh. The modules form a plane 
with each processor having connections only 
to its four nearest neighbors, thus forming a 
Manhattan geometry (orthogonal intercon-
nect). The circuit switching capability is used 
both to establish the initial data path configu-
ration and to reconfigure the SPA in order to 
maintain an active configuration. lbis is 
accomplished by isolating failed modules and 
switching spare units into the active configu-
ration. The physical implementation of this 
scheme allows the plane of processors to be 
formed logically into a toroid. lbis minimizes 
the longest data path, which maximizes over-
all system operating speed. 
The MIN is a fully distributed system. The 
element of the MIN residing in each node is 
the Configurable Network Unit (eND). The 
eND s in each unit are identical. Each eND 
has two data path connections to each of its 
four nearest neighbors, for a total of eight 
7 
connections. Each of the eight interconnects 
is called an edge connector. Each edge con-
nector can be programmed to be an input or 
output, but not both simultaneously. Within 
the MIN, there are four internal data paths 
between the edge connectors and a system of 
multiplexers. The multiplexers allow any . 
edge connector to provide the input to one of 
the internal data paths. Each edge connector 
that is programmed to be an output can take 
its data from any of the four internal data 
paths. In this way, fanout is achieved by pro-
gramming several outputs from a given data 
path. Thus, up to four internal data paths can 
be established, with each data path consisting 
of an input edge connector, the internal path, 
and an output edge connector. 
Two of the four internal data paths have 
address recognition logic. These are called 
Network Interface Units (NIU) and will 
extract any word of data that is addressed to 
them., sending it to the processor associated 
with that node on the MIN. The ports also 
can place data in any unused data slot in the 
data path. When a port removes a data word, 
it can place (output) a new data word into the 
same slot for transmission down the MIN. 
The other two internal data paths merely pass 
data through the eND and to the next node in 
the MIN. These internal data paths are called 
vias. A port can act as a via by putting the 
same data word back on the data path and 
sending it downstream to the next node. An 
example of the internal connections of a eND 
is shown in Figure 1. Examples of SPA net-
work structures are shown in Figure 2. A 
complex example of an SPA network, with 
failed eNDs and with a mix of processor 
types, is shown in Figure 3. 
Present MIN hardware has information trans-
ferred at a rate of up to 8 million data words 
per second. The 52 bit data words are com-
prised of 32 bits of data, an 8 bit destination 
code, and other control information. Each 
data word has its own destination address; this 
allows data from different sources and going 
to different destinations to be interleaved on a 
given data path on a word by word basis. A 
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Figure 3. Complex SPA Network 
data path does not have to be reserved for 
exclusive use by any given module, which 
greatly reduces system latency. 
With MIN architecture, 
• Programmable data paths and destination 
code~ will minimize hardware and soft-
ware overhead; 
• No store and forward is required, as occurs 
in some other interconnect schemes; 
• The port only handles data for the associ-
ated modules; and 
• The application software is configuration 
independent. 
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Each data word carrying its own destination 
code means that no channel request protocol 
is required to send data. Data is queued for 
transfer and goes whenever room is available. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the rich interconnectivi-
ty of the MIN. The ability to reconfigure the 
MIN under software control makes an SPA 
system incredibly reliable and fault tolerant. 
Reliability - Fault Avoidance, Fault 
Detection, and Fault Tolerance 
The ability of an SPA system to achieve the 
required mission reliability is achieved 
through a combination of fault tolerance and 
fault avoidance at both the system and the 
module level. 
Fault Avoidance 
Fault avoidance is achieved by designing the 
hardware to be inherently reliable. At the 
SPA system level, the CNU elements in the 
MIN are designed to be one tenth as likely to 
suffer a failure as are their associated process-
ing modules. They were thus designed 
because studies have shown that the total loss 
of a CNU at a MIN node is a more serious 
resource loss to the SPA system than the loss 
of a processor module. This is because of the 
attendant loss of connectivity between other 
processing elements at other nodes. 
Fault avoidance at the processing module 
level is achieved by: 
• Minimizing component counts 
• Raceless design rules that eliminate fail-
ures due to changes in circuit timing and 
delays 
• U sing Very Large Scale Integrated (VLSI) 
circuitry to minimize pans count 
• Time multiplexed buses to minimize the 
number of wires and solder joints 
• PhysicaVmechanical designs that keep the 
semiconductor junction temperatures low 
• Using CMOS/SOS technology to resist 
single event upsets due to radiation. 
These fault avoidance features are used on the 
existing hardware. 
Fault Detection 
To use fault tolerance strategies. it is neces-
sary to first detect the faults and then. as prac-
tical, to isolate them. Fault detection at the 
system level, with the MIN, and with individ-
ual modules will be discussed individually. 
System Level 
System level fault detection involves multiple 
modules. The following are common tech-
niques used. 
• Heartbeat techniques - a heartbeat system 
has each module periodically send a mes-
sage to the system monitor. This monitor 
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may be a single processor, or a designated 
processor on each ring, or other modules 
in a fully distributed system. The moni-
tors check that all active modules have 
reponed within the appropriate time peri-
od. The method tests both the communi-
cations capabilities of the MIN and the . 
health status of individual modules. If a 
message is not received from an individual 
module, there is probably a problem with 
that module. If, messages are not received 
from several modules, it is likely that there 
is a break in the MIN data path, since 
heartbeats from the modules downstream 
from the break will still be received. 
Heartbeat is an example of a fault detec-
tion technique that immediately provides 
fault isolation data. Heartbeat techniques 
are implemented with system level soft-
ware, and will be discussed in the section 
on software. 
• Sample problems - where known data is 
injected into the data stream and the out-
put is checked for the proper answer. 
• Watchdog timers - where application pro-
cesses can be required to repon their sta-
tus periodically. 
• Load monitoring - in some applications, 
the processing load of an algorithm must be 
spread among several processors. Howev-
er the data is distributed, by monitoring 
the backlog and throughput of individual 
modules. defective modules can be detect-
ed and their load distributed to others. 
MIN Level 
The MIN has hardware fault detection. The 
current MIN hardware uses four identical 
VLSI in a bit slice fashion to form the CNU. 
Each bit slice has a parity bit to detect errors. 
Parity is checked when data is removed from 
the data path and sent to the processor. Fur-
ther, with 8 bits of data for the destination 
code of any data word, one of these bits can 
be used as parity. This allows 128 unique 
module destination addresses, none of which 
can be changed (without parity detecting it) 
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by a single bit flip. Software fault detection 
on the MIN is available as part of the SPA 
software operating system. Software con-
trolled timeouts are a fundamental method of 
detecting total failures of ring data paths. 
Block counts and request/acknowledge proto-
cols are also implemented in software to sup-
port block data transfers. 
Module Level 
Fault detection at the module level is achieved 
through use of the following mechanisms: 
• Bus parity 
• Microcode parity 
• SECDED (single error correction, double 
error detection) on memory 
• Parity on some internal registers 
• Memory address parity 
• Unimplemented memory detection 
• Memory block write protection 
• Privileged instructions 
• Page access lock and key 
Processor module diagnostics is another fault 
detection technique. On power up, microcod-
ed tests check that the microinstruction 
sequencer is working and that special memory 
locations can be read without error. 
Fault Tolerance 
Fault tolerance provides the means for a sys-
tem to operate without pathological behavior 
or without producing errors even though a 
fault has occurred at some system element. In 
general, fault tolerant activities should be as 
transparent as possible, occurring with mini-
mal user awareness and minimal interference 
to the operation of the system. The use of 
SECDED protected memories is a good. exam-
ple of a user transparent fault tolerant hard-
ware mechanism. 
At the SPA system level, one of the more 
powerful fault tolerance strategies is the use 
of spares. The switching capabilities of the 
CNU s in the MIN allow reconfiguration of 
the system to eliminate failed modules from 
the network and to incorporate operational 
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modules from a pool of spares into the sys-
tem's active processor suite. Pooled sparing 
provides significant reliability benefits over 
other sparing strategies (Figure 4). An exam-
ple of a reconfiguration around a failed mod-
ule using a spare is shown in Figure 5. Simu-
lations have shown that in significant sized . 
systems it is always possible to find a usable 
reconfiguration, even after multiple failures. 
Strategy 
15 Modules 100% Spares 
System Ufetime 
95% Confidence 
String --o-o-c:rD-fl-O--14 Days 
Parallel jDOD-D-I~ 
String ~J-D-f2 Months 
Pool 
1 
.~ 
:::J 
rJ) 
15 
Module Failure Rate 10 F/1 06HR 
l:' .50 
~ 
e 
0.. 
.51 2 :3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 14 
Utetime (Yr) 
Figure 4. Advantages of Pooled Sparing 
Physical Array 
An example mapping 
without failures 
SASS-OS 
Physical Array 
Reconfiguration after 
a failure 
Figure 5. Single Reconfiguration 
There are several different methods of main-
taining spared resources. Spare processing 
resources can be powered down (cold), pow-
ered up and loaded but not in use (warm), or 
can be running applications (hot). Cold spar-
ing uses minimum power; hot sparing mini-
mizes the time required to switch in the spare 
in face of a failure. In addition, electronic 
components have a lower failure rate when 
powered down (dormancy factor), so that cold 
sparing enhances the overall life of the sys-
tem. Most specifications attribute a value of 
ten to the dormancy factor, i.e., the failure rate 
for powered off hardware is one tenth of that 
which is powered on. Thus, for cases where 
the system or function can be stopped, cold 
sparing is preferred because it uses less power 
and can accrue reliability benefits from the 
dormancy· factor. For time critical situations, 
where the system must operate through fail-
ures, hot sparing is preferred. 
While the ultimate form'of network fault tol-
erance is to reconfigure and replace failed 
processing elements with functional modules 
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from a spares pool, there are certain data path 
structures that can be programmed to allow 
fault tolerance without reconfiguration. One 
of these is the use of dual, counter-rotating 
rings. This gives every module two paths to 
every other module. In the case of the catas-
trophic failure of a ring element, the alternate 
path is used. An example of a counter-rotat-
ing ring structure is shown in Figure 6. The 
reaction to a ring failure in this situation is 
shown in Figure 7. 
A last effort system level fault tolerant strategy 
is to move a processing task from a processor 
of one type to a processor of another type 
that has adequate, though not optimal, pro-
cessing resources to perform the calculations. 
This option may have significant impact on sys-
tem performance and is more of a "graceful 
Logical Structure 
PM1 PM2 PM3 PM4 
----..... -- Ring B ---
-..._--..... -- Ring A ----
-
PM1 
r .................. ~ 
!unusedl 
! PM l 
~ ................. "", .. ' 
Physical Hookup 
, ...................... , 
• • !unused! 
: PM : 
• • \" ................. -~ 
PM2 
PM4 PM3 
Figure 6. Counter-Rotating Ring Structure 
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PM1 PM2 PM3 PM4 
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CD 
'3 
"8 PM2 B X B B 
::E 
CD 
t! PM3 
::::l 
A A X A 
0 
CJ) 
PM3 A A B X 
Usable Ring After CNU Failure 
Figure 7. Data Path Failure with Counter-Rotating Rings 
degradation" technique than a fault tolerant 
strategy. Similarly, the dropping (deletion and 
de-allocation) of processes when inadequate 
spares remain to perform the total mission 
function is an end-of-life strategy. 
Another MIN fault tolerance method involves 
lost data. Since misaddressed data would cir-
cle a ring endlessly, there is a hardware mech-
anism to remove data that has circled a ring 
completely. To do this function, one of the 
CNU s in a ring would enable the lost data 
detector. When the lost data bit is set (upon 
one complete revolution of a ring) and the 
data encountered at the appointed node, the 
data is removed. 
Fault tolerance at the module level is also pos-
sible. For example, SPA applications are gen-
erally structured into applications programs 
and data bases. The data bases are separate 
from the current or temporary program con-
text, and updates to the data bases are per-
formed at carefully selected intervals. 
Changes are accumulated in a local copy of 
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the data, and the update is not performed until 
the current processing is complete. This 
means that the time during which a data base 
is being updated is small, reducing the likeli-
hood of an error during the update. Further-
more, any error that occurs before an update 
may be corrected by a restart, if the application 
allows. The data base serves as a checkpoint, 
in that a (checkpoint) restart (which does not 
completely reset the database) will "roll back" 
the application to its last data base update. 
A simple fault tolerance mechanism is the use 
of one of a pair of dual CPUs within a pro-
cessing module as a cold, warm, or hot spare. 
The final fault tolerance technique discussion 
involves pairs of modules checkpointing each 
other's data bases, acting as partners for 
checkpointing purposes. In addition, one or 
more warm spares are configured into the sys-
tem. These spares are loaded with the soft-
ware, but do not process data. When a dis-
tributed system uses more than one algorithm, 
it is sometimes possible to have the warm 
spare serve for more than one part of the total 
application. The warm spare in this case can 
contain two or more sets of software; when 
the spare is activated, it is notified which 
algorithm to run. 
When a module fails, its checkpoint partner 
detects the failure (via the system level fault 
detection mechanism of heartbeat), and han-
dles the recovery. The partner copies the 
checkpoint data to the appropriate spare, and 
sends notification to all modules in the system 
that the spare has begun processing for the 
failed module. Figure 8 illustrates pair-wise 
checkpointing. 
Checkpoint Checkpoint 
Exchange E)(change 
~ ... ~
The spare takes over for C. 
Checkpoinl 
~ ... ~ 
rw;;;;J 
~ 
Figure 8. Pair-wise Checkpointing 
The expected failure mode distribution of an 
SPA system with ten active modules over a 
seven year mission is shown in Figure 9. This 
data is based on a Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) and reliability analysis of 
the existing system. 
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Single Network 
9.4% 
Internally 
Non-Recoverable 
13.2% 
Hot Spare 
• 10 Active Modules 
• 7 Years 
Multiple Network 
3.8% 
R9COnfiguration 
1. Internal, Recoverable Failure 
Example: Memory Chip 
Recovery: Memory Remap Under Processor 
Control 
2. Internal, Nonrecoverable Failure 
Example: CPU Fails 
Recovery: Shed Load, Shut Down. Schedule 
Repair 
3. Single Network Failure 
Example: CNU Failure or Module Power Supply 
Recovery: Redirect Traffic on Counter-Rotating 
Rings. Schedule Repair 
4. Multiple Network Failure 
Example: Trauma 
Recovery: On-Board Reconfiguration, Emergency 
Repair 
5. On-Board Recovery Failure 
Example: Gremlin 
Recovery: Ground Directed 
SASS-9 
Figure 9. Expected Failure Mode Distribution 
of an SPA System 
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Existing Hardware and Software 
Many of the basic elements of the data pro-
cessing system concept described have 
already been implemented as part of develop-
ment or flight pro~ams. Among these are the 
Control Data 444R2 spaceborne processor, 
and a nine node SPA system jointly developed 
by Control Data and Boeing. Part of that SPA 
program served to develop, test, and deliver 
executive/applications support software. A 
high speed signal processing unit (SPU) has 
been designed, simulated, and partly laid out 
and entered into a CAD data base. Plans have 
also been made to enable the interfacing of an 
existing 32-bit Reduced Instruction Set Com-
puter (RISC) machine to an SPA. 
444R 2 Spacebome Processor 
The 444R2 ("444" because the computer is 
approximately a four-inch cube, R2 because it 
is Rugged and Reliable) computer was 
designed for spacecraft control and sensor 
data processing. The 444R2 is the next gener-
ation of computer to replace the Control Data 
469RR, a previous generation machine with 
the enviable record of never having suffered a 
mission lifetime failure in a total flight history 
of over 608,000 operational hours (as of 
6/15/1990), and having never dela1,ed a 
launch. The new generation 444R uses 
VLSI technology to increase performance, 
memory capacity, and reliability through new 
design, new fault tolerant features, and 
reduced parts count. 
The 444R2 has the following features: 
• MIL-STD-1750A Instruction Set Archi-
tecture (ISA) 
• Single or dual CPU, with a single proces-
sor throughput rate of 1.2 MIPS, DAIS 
mix, with an 8 MHz system clock 
• Single Error Correction, Double Error 
Detection (SEffiED) memory 
• Single or dual serial I/O 
• CMOS/SOS technology for intrinsic radia-
tion hardness 
• Small size, light weight, and low power 
consumption. 
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Figure 10 shows the 444R2 architecture. The 
computer is configured internally with three 
functional units: 
• Central Processing Unit (CPU) 
• Memory Unit (MU) 
• Input/output Unit (IOU) 
• Single or Dual CPU 
• 2 Internal Buses, 
One for Each CPU (or 
Spare). No CPU Bus 
Contention 
• Up to 8 VO devices, up 
to 4 with DMA 
• DMA VO on Either Bus 
• 1 to 8 Memory Units, 
Dual Ported to Both 
Buses 
Figure 10. 444R2 Architecture 
The 444R2 can accommodate up to 12 func-
tional units within a system, allowing the user 
to configure a 444R2 to solve the mission's 
computing requirements. The system also 
allows single or dual CPUs and IOUs, and up 
to eight MUs. Typical444R2 configurations 
are shown in Figure 11. Data and commands 
are transferred between functional units on 
dual memory buses. A single control bus is 
used for interrupts, enables, clocks and other 
control signals. 
Either CPU or the IOU can serve as the 444R 2 
controller. All I/O and memory management 
are perfonned by the controller. The controller 
accomplish~s these tasks by reading and writ-
ing registers in the units using one of the 
memory access buses (as shown in Figure 10). 
If there are two active CPUs, one is normally 
the controller and the other acts as a "slave" 
or coprocessor. The master directs I/O and 
controls the page registers for both CPUs. 
The slave CPU contains a reduced version of 
CPUs MUs Memory IiO Size Power Weight (KWords) (W x 0 x H) (In) (Watts Reg) (Pounds) 
1 4 256 DSIOU 5x4.1 x 4.7 12 3.8 
2 4 256 DSIOU 5x4.5x4.7 19 4.2 
1 8 512 DSIOU 5x 6.7 x 4.7 13 5.5 
2 8 512 DSIOU 5x7.1x4.7 20 5.9 
. 
SASS-II 
Figure 11. Typical 444R 2 Configurations 
the executive software and interacts with the 
controller to obtain I/O and other control ser-
vices. Additional partitioning of executive 
functions between CPUs is application specif-
ic and tailored to the mission requirements. 
Engineering models (form, fit, and function) 
have been tested and delivered. The 444R 2 
was designed to withstand vigorous flight 
environments at levels shown in Figure 12. 
The first flight module is scheduled for deliv-
ery in January, 1991. 
Parameter Design Goal 
Mechanical 
Temperature -40°C to + 75°C 
Pressure 810 TORR to 10·1OTORR 
Random Vibration 22 g RMS All Axis 
Pyro Shock 3000 9 
Electrical 
EMC· 
Susceptability 
(Radiated, Elect) 
Conducted 
Emissions 
(Broadband) 
Radiated 
Emissions 
(Elect. Broadband) 
SPA-l Hardware 
SPA-I, a nine module SPA system, was fabri-
cated, tested, and delivered as part of a joint 
development program between Control Data 
and Boeing Electronics. SPA-l provided inte-
grated hardware and software to demonstrate: 
• A functional MIN 
• Multiple processor capability 
• Reliability and reconfiguration 
• Data movement across the network and 
between processing modules 
• Fault detection and isolation 
Program A Program B 
-22.7°C to +60°C -34°C to +71·C 
10·5TORR 10·5TORR 
15 g RMS Overall 6.5 9 RMS + 6db Overall 
N/A 1000 9 
1 VIM 14 KHz to 18 GHz 10 VIM 14 KHz to 30 MHz 
5 VIM 30 KHz to 10 GHz 
20 VIM 10KHz to 40 GHz 
80 db (uA)/MHz 80 db (uA)/MHz 
250 KHz, Rolloff to 15 KHz, Rolloff to 
40 db, Continuous 60 db, Continuous 
2.5 MHz to 400 "MHz 50 MHz to 100 MHz 
20 db (uV)/MlMHz 120 db (uV)IMIMHz 
2.5 MHz to 126 MHz 40 KHz, Rolloff to 
RoUoff to 40 db 75 db 200 MHz, RoUoff to 
1.26 GHz to 18 GHz 90 db at 1 GHz 
SASS·12 . . • Sample only, fuJI range of susceptabilily, conducted and radiatIOn test to be performed . 
Figure 12. 444R2 Environments 
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The delivered SPA-1 system is shown in Fig-
ure 13. A test set, and debugging and soft-
ware development tools were also delivered as 
part of this contract. 
Only three of the nine nodes in SPA-l had 
processors. Two of these processors were 
smart I/O modules, Le., I/O units with CPUs, 
a variation of the basic 444R 2, and the other a 
basic 444R 2. The other six nodes on the MIN 
were "stubs" that electronically terminated the 
MIN elements to allow the net to function 
with no processor attached to the CNUs at any 
of these nodes. 
While the 444R2s used on SPA-! are space 
qualifiable, no plans have been made to make 
this configuration of the SPA flightworthy. 
SPA -1, the MIN in particular, is, and always 
has been, a proof of concept vehicle that is 
reasonably close to the function of the first 
SPA flight hardware, but would be redesigned 
to miniaturize the hardware even further. 
Signal Processing Module (SPM) 
Control Data has developed a signal process-
ing module design. The design has evolved to 
PortatiieTesf$Ett 
match the interface requirements of the SPA 
network and to satisfy the functional and per-
formance requirements of anticipated radar, 
ELINT, and electro-optical missions. The 
SPM is a 16 bit fixed point/20 bit floating 
point, two to six stage, pipe lined processor 
capable of over 380 MFLOPS (Million FLoat-
ing point Operations Per Second). The size 
and power constraints are the same as for any 
processor at an SPA node. The design is 
based on the same CMOS/SOS technology 
used in the Control Data/Boeing SPA-1 unit 
described above. This corresponds to a 1.25 
micron feature size, two-layer metal design, 
providing packing densities of approximately 
20,()()(} gates per chip (less than 1 cm square). 
Three new VLSI types have been designed: 
two to gate level (ZYCAD simulated) and one 
to register level. 
The SPM is architecturally flexible in that 
different numbers of stages can be assembled 
to meet different mission dependent signal 
processing requirements. One card, the Signal 
Processing Section (SPS), has a maximum 
computation rate of 96 MFLOPS; thus a 
typical four unit SPM would offer a maximum 
rate of 384 MFLOPS. The SPM is not a 
MicreVAXII" DEeNET" Software I--;........:::::;:~ ____ ~..tt---+j Development 
SAS$-13 
DRV.nWJ)RY-11W Host (V AX)" 
PTS 
Adaptor 
PTS 
,Adaptor Hardware Configuration SPA·1 
Deliverables 
• DECNET and VAX Registered Trademarks 01 Digital Equipment Corporation. 
Figure 13. SPA-l Configuration 
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hardwired unit; its programmability allows it 
to suppon a very wide variety of algorithms as 
shown in Figure 14. Figure 15 shows fast 
fourier transform (FFf) execution times as a 
function of FFf length. Filtering (fourier or 
FIR) is a frequently used technique in the area 
of signal processing. 
• FFT & FFT-1 
• Power Spectral 
DensitylMeanl 
Variance 
• Aperture Weighting 
• CFAR 
• Band Pass Filtering 
• Rectangular/Polar 
Conversion 
• Matrix Inversion 
(Eigenvector 
Calculation) 
SASS-14 
• Sliding Window 
Averaging 
• Block/Exponential 
Integration 
• Thresholding 
• Beam Splitting 
(Monopulse) 
• Polar Processing 
• FIR 
• IIR 
Figure 14. Signal Processing Unit Typical 
Algorithms 
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The SPM has fault tolerance features designed 
into it, including SEeDED protection for con-
stant memory and microcode memory. Single 
bit errors are automatically corrected when a 
value is read. A rewrite or "scrubbing" cycle 
can be enabled to avoid long term accumula-
tion of single bit errors. This involves reading 
a constant on one cycle and writing the 
scrubbed constant back on the next cycle. 
The SPM also has features protecting against 
synchronization errors. Should a corrupt data 
block or some undetected (multiple bit) upset 
cause an out-of-synch condition, the basic 
SPM array element automatically resynchro-
nizes itself. An end-of-block flag is passed 
from SPM section to section, and each ele-
ment in the array unconditionally resynchro-
nizes itself when the flag is received. This-
guarantees that an out-of-synch condition can-
not last longer than two blocks. 
SPA Software 
An SPA operating system was developed as 
part of the Control Data/Boeing development 
0 
flO 
10 100 
SAS8-15 Execution Time - Microseconds 
Figure 15. SPU FFf Execution TImes 
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effort that resulted in the SPA-1 hardware 
. described above. Demonstration software 
simulating a simple multi-module application 
was also coded. This software included multi-
module processing, data passing around a ring 
on the MIN, detection and isolation of an 
induced hardware fault, and reconfiguration 
after failure. 
The operating system, Operational Kernel 
(OK) was written in Ada, except for those 
routines that had to read or write hardware 
registers directly. Such code was written in 
1750A assembly language. 
Support for the execution of Ada programs is 
provided by the Ada run time executive 
(ARTE). The ARTE is included in every active 
processor module in the SPA and is compati-
ble with the Ada compilation system. The 
ARTE used was supplied by the compilation 
system vendor. The OK consists of Ada pack-
ages that are built on top of the ARTE. This 
collection of packages provides operating sys-
tem services not available from the ARTE, 
which provides basic services such as tasking, 
memory management, and exception handling. 
The OK demonstrates that cooperative appli-
cations executing in multiple modules of the 
SPA can communicate through the MIN as 
configured by the users. The OK also pro-
vides support for applications in detecting and 
isolating faults in the SPA as well as in recon-
figuring around such detected faults. 
The control of the SPA/MIN by the OK is 
divided into lower level driver services and 
optional high level communication and con-
trol services. The lower level driver services 
involve the following interface devices: 
• Port (network interface unit) 
Message buffers 
Input buffers 
Program control transfers 
Block transfers 
Interrupt handling 
• CNUs 
Configuration commands 
Interrupt handling 
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• Serial I/Os 
Program control transfers 
Block transfers 
Interrupt handling 
The higher level services include: 
• MINIO - a block I/O facility for the MIN 
using protocols to ensure the integrity of 
data transfers between modules. 
• HEARTBEAT - a healthcheck facility to 
support application controlled fault detec-
tion and isolation on the MIN. 
• CONFIG - a configuration facility that 
provides a high level set of operations to 
configure and reconfigure the MIN. 
The SPA application environment is shown in 
Figure 16. The OK/application taskirig envi-
ronment for a multi-module SPA system is 
shown in Figure 17. 
Control Data wrote software for the Portable 
Test Set (PTS) that was delivered with SPA -1. 
The PTS software functions include the fol-
lowing: 
• Control functions - upon start-up, prompt 
the user for data about the module(s) 
under test, and how the PTS itself is to 
operate, e.g., logging of inputs and outputs. 
• Probes - allow the user to monitor and 
control the module under test by enabling 
the writing and reading of registers, mem-
ory, and the issuing of I/O commands, and 
the setting and monitoring of discrete 
lines, e.g., reset 
• Loader - allows the user to load 1750A object 
files into a 444R 2 at a node on the MIN. 
• Diagnostics - offer many user controllable 
session options, e.g., control of repetition 
of tests (number of times, number of 
errors,:iJ}d time of day), control of dispo-
sition of output (to screen, logfiles, and 
hardcopy reports). 
Control Data modified a standard vendor 
1750A debugger/instruction level simulator to 
handle certain options and implementation 
specific characteristics of the 444R2,s 1750A 
hardware. The modified simulator also 
SSA5-16 
PM 
GP16 
PIM 
GP16 
SASS-17 
NIU I MIN Hardware 
SPA-1 Resident Application 
Support 
• Ada Run lime Environment 
from InterACT 
• Ada Based Communications 
Package from Module to 
Module 
- Message and Block I/O 
- Heartbeat Package 
- Guaranteed Delivery 
Protocol Package 
- Reconfiguration 
Support Package 
Figure 16. SPA Application Environment 
-Main- Appl Task 
ARTE R 
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OK Software 
OK Software 
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ARTE R R 
-Main" Appl Task 
f R => Rendezvous 
Figure 17. OK/Application Multi-Module Tasking Environment 
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enables the debugging of processor modules 
within an SPA. The debugging environment 
is shown in Figure 18. Figure 19 shows the 
general software development support system. 
User 
Symbolic 
Debugger 
Simulator 
Control Data 
Register 
Target Debugger 
Interface 
Target Interface 
Manager 
444R2 
Hardware 
• 444Ff Instruction Level 
Simulator 
- VAX' Host 
- 444R2 Instruc1ion Timings 
- 444R2 Registers and XIO 
Instructions 
• Target Symbolic Debugger 
- Ada and Assembler 
Supported 
- VAX Interface to 444~ 
Simulator 
- PTS Interface to 444Ft 
Hardware 
• VAX Registered Trademarks of Digital Equipment Corporation. 
SAS5-18 
Figure 18. SPAIPTS Symbolic Debugging Environment 
JOVIAL/ Ada 
Source 
Code 
Key 
O Vendor SupplIed 
C' Control Data Developed 
or Modified 
XIO 
Macros 
1750A 
Assembler 
• VAX Registered Trademarks of Oig~aJ Equipment Corporation. 
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PTS 
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PIM 
GP16 
SymbOlic 
Debugger & 
Simulator 
Target 
Debugger 
SPA·1 
Hardware 
and 
Software 
Figure 19. Software Development Support System 
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SPA-1 
Future SMARTSAT Development 
There are several areas of development in 
which Control Data is working to improve the 
SMARTSAT processing concept. 
New Processors 
New processor types will need to be devel-
oped to exploit Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
constructs and other specialized processing 
techniques fully. These new devices must be 
designed with the special environments of 
orbital operation as primary considerations 
(especially the radiation environment). 
Existing Processors 
Some existing processors, depending on 
"designed for space" suitability, can be inter-
faced to the configurable MIN to exploit prior 
development and to solve special problems. 
hnproved Packaging 
New packaging techniques can be exploited to 
reduce the size, weight, and power of the pro-
cessing net even further. While already low, 
these characteristics can be significantly 
reduced by the judicious use of today's pack-
aging technology. An example is the packag-
ing of two 1750A processors in a single two-
inch square hybrid package. This results in a 
volume reduction factor of six and a weight 
reduction factor of 20, compared to the 
444R2. The project was a cooperative effort 
between MCC and Control Data as a proof of 
concept for Tape Automated Bonding (TAB) 
techniques for a direct die to substrate packag-
ing approach (Figure 20). 
Disk Storage 
Significant on-board processing produces a 
great need for on orbit non-volatile mass 
Figure 20. Dual 1750A Processor 
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storage of data and software. Development of 
a "space hardened" magnetic or rewritable 
optical disk drive for inclusion in the process-
ing net will be relatively simple. Present 
designs exist for militarized disks which with-
stand shock and vibration, but need to be 
modified for radiation and zero-g. 
Inductive Power Connect 
NASA has demonstrated an inductive power 
interconnect across a .015 in. air gap that 
would provide power transfer into a module 
with no physical electrical connection. This 
provides the possibility of complete electrical 
isolation of a module and elimination of con-
nectors (with all their reliability/maintainabili-
ty problems). 
Optical Data Interconnect 
NASA has also demonstrated communication 
over a small air gap (.015 in.) of data at 50 
MBIT rates using LEDs. This technique 
would allow a module to be merely placed in 
the correct position to provide complete func-
tionality with no electrical connections. 
Total System Integration 
To properly use a processing net as described 
above, individual technologies that comprise 
the SMARTS AT must be integrated to a high-
er degree than has ever been accomplished 
before in a space system. This will require 
close cooperation of the integrator and all sub-
system contractors to eliminate unnecessary 
hardware while maintaining full functionality. 
This approach is a dramatic departure from 
the conventional space hardware program 
wherein each function is isolated with defined 
interfaces. The conventional approach leads 
to large segmented systems with significant 
interface hardware. In addition, the traditional 
approach is to ship all data to the ground for 
exhaustive analysis by a supporting team of 
experts and analysts, This approach has been 
successful, but very expensive, and makes 
timely distribution of results difficult. 
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Another area of potential cost savings lies in 
the usage of limited life satellites. Since low 
earth orbits decay relatively rapidly, the 
expected lifetime of the SMARTSAT would 
be comparatively short. Because of the low 
cost boosters available and the anticipated low 
cost of the satellites, potential cost savings 
abound in the "Hi-ReI" area. One of the prin-
cipal cost drivers in conventional space pro-
grams is the extreme reliability measures. 
This is justified for large systems because of 
the expense of launch and replacement. 
With the advent of small satellites, Control 
Data can address these costs and take calculat-
ed risks reliability-wise. One of the major 
tasks associated with the SMARTSAT efforts 
will be to establish which "Hi-ReI" processes 
can be modified while still providing high 
mission probability of success. In addition, 
properly designed fault tolerance and isolation 
features further reduce the need for extremely 
high reliability (expensive) components to 
achieve mission goals. 
Control Data's SMARTSAT architecture will 
satisfy its users' needs and provide mecha-
nisms for high reliability. When the tradition-
al approach is contrasted with the real-time 
information availability of the SMARTSAT, 
the desirability of small, capable, intelligent 
satellite systems is obvious. 
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GLOSSARY I 
Ada A DOD programming language I ADAC Attitude Detennination And Control AI Artificial Intelligence 
ARTE Ada Run Time Executive 
CNU Configurable Network Unit I CONUS Continental United States 
CMOS/SOS Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor/Silicon On 
Sapphire I CPU Central Processing Unit 
DAIS Name for a particular instruction mix 
DMA Direct Memory Access I DOD Department of Defense 
ELINT Electronic Intelligence 
FDIAR Fault Detection, Isolation, Assessment, and Recovery I FFT Fast Fourier Transform FIR Finite Impulse Response 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
I IFF Identification Friend or Foe IOU Input/Output Unit 
IR InfraRed 
ISA Instruction Set Architecture I LED Light Emitting Diode 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
MBIT Megabit (of memory) (1 million bits) I MCC Microelectronic Computer Consortium 
MFLOPS Million FLoating point Operations Per Second 
MIN Module Interconnect Network I MIPS Million Instructions Per Second 
MU Memory Unit 
OK Operational Kernel I PTS Portable Test Set RAM Random Access Memory 
RISC Reduced Instruction Set Computer 
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar I SDI Strategic Defense Initiative 
SECDED Single Error Correction, Double Error Detection 
SMARTSAT SMART Satellite I SPA Space Processing Array 
SPM Signal Processing Module 
SPS Signal Processing SectioI'! I SPU Signal Processing Unit 
UV UltraViolet 
VLSI Very Large Scale Integrated (Circuitry) I 
I 
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